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Paradoxes of Court-Centered Legal History:
Some Values of Historical Understanding
for a Practical Legal Education
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.
Today legal education is under scrutiny and law schools under assault.
Social, economic, and political developments have combined with major
structural changes in the market for legal services to create acute difficulties,
and voices across the country are understandably calling for lower-cost
programs and “practice-ready” graduates.1 The challenge for law schools is to
address those issues while maintaining the highest standards of professional
excellence and truly educating students for future legal careers.
Unfortunately, many commentators fail to discuss either the substantive
requirements of a quality legal education or the professional capacities
necessary for lawyers to meet the demands of a changing profession in a
changing world. Many, too, offer ideas and suggestions that reflect unduly
narrow and quite shortsighted views of both law and education. Urging
students to take only “bread-and-butter courses,” for example, Justice Antonin
Scalia scorned as “frill” all classes involving “law and” titles—dismissing in
particular courses on “law and women” and “law and poverty”; his advice was
sweeping and absolute: “do not take ‘law and anything.’”2 Such comments
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1.

E.g., Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, (A.B.A., Working Paper, August 1, 2013),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/taskforcecomments/aba_task_force_working_paper_august_2013.
authcheckdam.pdf. The nature and significance of “practice-ready,” however, may be
far more complicated than many suppose. See Deborah J. Merritt, An Employment Puzzle,
Law School Café (June 18, 2013, 10:24 PM), http://www.lawschoolcafe.org/thread/anemployment-puzzle/. For an emphasis on the continued need for law schools to promote
social justice, see Edgar Cahn, Choosing the Right Law School, The Huffington Post (Feb.
11, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edgar-cahn/choosing-the-right-lawsc_b_4763820.html.

2.

“The only time you’re going to have an opportunity to study a whole area of the law
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suggest that the only valuable courses are those devoted to ostensibly pure and
self-contained “legal” subjects with little or no relationship to pressing practical
problems, disputed cultural understandings, or overarching social contexts.
Such a crabbed understanding of both law and education contrasts sharply
with deeper understandings that recognize that law must continually confront
shifting real-world conditions and that a full legal education must illuminate the
complex and dynamic interrelations between “the law” and all that surrounds
and shapes it. More than a century ago Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., captured
the fundamental insight that inspires such deeper understandings. “To be
master of any branch of knowledge,” he explained, “you must master those
which lie next to it….”3
That penetrating truth shines as a guiding beacon for all quality legal
education and, indeed, for all true education in any area. One cannot thoroughly
understand any subject unless one understands the varied forces and factors
that constitute and condition it. For lawyers and judges, understanding the
social complexities and practical contingencies that shape the law and drive
its operations is essential. Such an understanding requires an education that
reaches far beyond doctrine and technique, an education that illuminates the
profound interrelationships that exist between the world of law and the world
of life.
Legal history is an invaluable component of such an education.
I. The Utility of Legal History
Legal history explores a vast, complex, and ever-changing subject that is
both inherently practical and inherently theoretical. It demands inquiry into
issues that range from those involving the most refined distinctions of logic
to the most enduring puzzles of philosophy, from the most individualized
and personal of human motivations to the most sweeping and compelling of
social forces, and from the noblest ideals of politics and morals to the most
pragmatic, shrewd, and even ruthless techniques that mark the practice of able
lawyers. As then-Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo explained, the “endless variety”
of the law’s challenges presents “a source of never-ceasing wonder.”4 Law
and its history are subjects in which little or nothing of true significance—if
systematically is in law school … You should not waste that opportunity. Take the breadand-butter courses. Do not take ‘law and women,’ do not take ‘law and poverty,’ do not
take ‘law and anything’.” Kyle Roerink, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia Warns Against ‘Living’
Constitution, Casper Star-Tribune (Oct. 26, 2012, 8:00am), http://trib.com/news/stateand-regional/u-s-supreme-court-justice-scalia-warns-against-living-constitution/article_
b0a197f2-20f5-5634-bd30-7ed1f4b705de.html (Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, during
a speaking engagement at the University of Wyoming Law School, advising students that
they should avoid “frill courses” during their time in school).
3.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Profession of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 29, 30
(1920).

4.

Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes
legal process … is its lure.” Id. at 134.
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probed deeply enough—proves simple or one-dimensional.5 Most immediately
relevant, legal history teaches the varying ways in which law and legal systems
have operated in practice, the reasons they have changed over time, and the
more likely directions and limits of their future development. There “can be
no constancy in law,” Cardozo explained, because the “kinetic forces are too
strong for us.”6 Thus, it is essential to consult “the revealing light of history.”7
Indeed, the “revealing light of history” shows that those “kinetic forces”
arise not just from myriad social pressures external to law and the judicial
process but also from the law’s own internal processes of reasoning and
decision-making. It is often said that the structure and content of the law have
been built up case by case and “brick by brick” over the centuries by successive
generations of judges. Legal history shows us that those judicial precedents,
however inspiring and time-honored they may be, are hardly bricks. It shows,
rather, that they are tiny sculptures produced by individual craft and marked by
their own special indentations, protrusions, and curvatures. It also shows that
they are made not of granite but of clay and that thin flakes have worn away,
tiny pieces chipped off, and patches and additions fitted to them with a variety
of materials. Indeed, when we ourselves handle those delicate sculptures for
study, we recognize that the faint warmth and slight pressure of our fingers
threaten to alter them yet again.
Scholars have sought to identify the most general insights that legal
history offers, and most would likely agree with those identified by Professor
Jim Phillips of the University of Toronto. First, legal history leads to a
better understanding not only of the “nature” of law itself but also—more
particularly and practically—of the critical “limitations of law.”8 Second, it
shows the contingency of law, the ways in which the law changes over time
and the extent to which extralegal social factors shape its evolution. Third,
legal history teaches the relative autonomy of the judicial process, the complex
lesson that the judicial process operates with varying degrees of independence
from those extralegal social forces and that legal rules often direct or at least
5.

Gordon S. Wood, The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of History 10-12
(2008). Such complexity means that legal historians disagree about a wide range of issues,
including both methods and goals. For a well-known exchange, see Robert W. Gordon &
William Nelson, An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies Between Robert W. Gordon and William Nelson, 6
Law & Hist. Rev. 139 (1988).

6.

Cardozo, supra note 4, at 11. “We take a false and one-sided view of history when we ignore
its dynamic aspects.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 104 (1924). For a
discussion of Cardozo’s writings on law and the judicial process, see Andrew L. Kaufman,
Cardozo 203-22 (1998), and for Cardozo’s effort to reconcile his own views with the
emergent “legal realism” of the early 1930s, see id. at 456-61.

7.

Cardozo, supra note 4, at 67. During the past half-century legal history has expanded rapidly
as a field and begun to explore law’s past in a nearly infinite range of areas and subjects.
Compare the works cited in notes 25, 79-81, and 83 infra with a discussion of the field as it
existed in 1967. Calvin Woodard, History, Legal History, and Legal Education, 53 Va. L. Rev. 89
(1967).

8.

Jim Phillips, Why Legal History Matters, 41 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 293, 294 (2010).
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channel its results.9 Finally, legal history liberates students and practitioners
by showing that what they “think of as the law today” has “in fact not always
predominated.”10 It thereby enables them to imagine “other worlds, other
ways of doing things.”11 Professor John McLaren of the University of Victoria
put much of the matter succinctly. Legal history, he explained, teaches “the
contingent nature and ideological quality of law making.”12
Many commentators, especially those outside the field, might minimize the
importance of those contributions or even reject them entirely. Some might
believe that showing “the contingent nature and ideological quality” of law
is undesirable, dangerous, or even nihilistic. Legal history’s lessons might
be unwelcome, for example, to those “originalists” who purport to discern
the Constitution’s true and unchanging meaning and thereby proclaim
themselves its authoritative expositors.13 Others might discount the proffered
contributions of legal history because they believe that law schools should
minimize or abandon “frill” courses and concentrate on clinics, “practicebased” courses, and methodical “skills” training. Such commentators might
believe that legal history can contribute little or nothing to the training of
“practice-ready” graduates.14
In response to the former group, legal historians can do little more than
continue what they have been doing. They can only continue to show, for everexpanding numbers of issues and with ever-swelling amounts of evidence,
that “originalism” is an inadequate, unreliable, and easily manipulable
methodology.15 Indeed, they can continue to show that “originalism,” at least
9.

Id., at 295, 302.

10.

Id., at 308.

11.

Id., at 305.

12.

John McLaren, The Legal Historian, Masochist or Missionary? A Canadian’s Reflections, 5 Legal Educ.
Rev. 67, 83 (1994).

13.

Commitment to “originalist” contentions may explain why Justice Scalia endorsed a
relatively narrow and socially desiccated type of legal education. See supra text accompanying
note 2. Some who consider themselves originalists recognize the severe limitations of the
approach. “Very often, particularly in areas where things have changed so much,” Justice
Samuel Alito acknowledged, “identifying the [originalist] principle doesn’t really decide
the case.” Joan Biskupic, American Original: The Life and Constitution of Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia 352 (2009).

14.

In the legal academy itself, few if any clinicians or “practice-oriented” faculty members
would likely consider legal history a “frill” subject, and few if any legal historians would deny
the value and necessity of clinics, skills training, practice-oriented courses, and professional
internships.

15.

Originalist sources and methods can usually be adapted to justify a wide range of diverse
and conflicting contemporary policies. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism
(2011). Scholarly and historical critiques of “originalism” have proliferated. See, e.g.,
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional
Enterprise (2007); Dennis J. Golford, The American Constitution and the Debate
Over Originalism (2005); Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking
Certainty: The Misguided Quest For Constitutional Foundations (2002); H.
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in some of its particularly strident contemporary forms, itself constitutes a
paradigmatic example of law’s “contingent nature and ideological quality.”16
As no less a staunch and self-proclaimed originalist as Robert Bork admitted,
using the past to justify normative legal conclusions readily allows judgments
that are subjective, arbitrary, and self serving. “History and tradition are very
capacious suitcases,” he explained, “and a judge may find a good deal pleasing
to himself packed into them, if only because he has packed the bags himself.”17
In response to the latter group, legal historians could stand with Holmes
and simply reject the idea that legal education should be so predominantly
practical. “I do not consider the student of the history of legal doctrine bound
to have a practical end in view,” Holmes declared. “It is perfectly proper to
regard and study the law simply as a great anthropological document.”18
Whatever the intellectual merits of that claim, however, it seems unavailing
in light of the present circumstances that law schools confront. The fact that
“anthropological” learning is valuable does not mean that it should be taught
in law schools instead of anthropology, social science, or history departments.
To the immediate point, Holmes’ claim ignores the pressing contemporary
educational questions: Does legal history contribute to a full, sound, and truly
practical legal education? If so, how?
Legal historians have offered a number of suggestions.19 Professor McLaren,
for example, points to a vital connection between the study of legal history and
the demands of legal practice. The “mere fact that a lawyer has an understanding
of the history of the law, legal institutions and legal ideology,” he explained, is
likely “to produce a more reflective, intelligent and less dogmatic approach to
what she or he does in legal practice.”20 Others have suggested that practicing
Jefferson Powell, A Community Built on Words: The Constitution in History and
Politics (2002); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev.
204 (1980). For a detailed recent consideration of one specific “originalist” argument, see, e.g.,
Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731 (2010).
16.

See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and compare Reva Siegel,
Comment, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191 (2008);
Robert Leider, Our Non-Original Right to Bear Arms: How Public Opinion Has Shaped the Second
Amendment, 89 Ind. L. J. 1587 (2014).

17.

Robert H. Bork, The Tempting
(1990).

18.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, in Collected Legal Papers,
supra note 3, at 212.

19.

For a growing interest among legal historians in the question of their field’s practical uses,
see, e.g., Sally Gordon, On the Market, Legal History Blog (Aug. 8, 2013, 1:01 PM), http://
legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/on-market.html; Roman Hoyos, Legal Historians,
Law Schools, and “Utility”, The Faculty Lounge, Aug. 10, 2013, http://www.thefacultylounge.
org/2013/08/legal-historians-utility-and-law-schools.html; Albert Brophy, Introducing Applied
Legal History, 31 L. & Hist. Rev. 233 (2013) and entries on the Legal History Blog, e.g.,
Aug. 1, 2009, July 25, 2012, and Oct. 19, 2012, available at http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.
com/2012/10/legal-history-as-skills-training.html.

20.

McLaren, supra note 12, at 83.
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America: The Political Seduction
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lawyers cannot hope to effectively distinguish or defend the legal authorities
bearing on their cases without a clear understanding of the historical contexts
and purposes that produced them.21 More specifically, Professor William E.
Nelson of New York University maintained that legal history is “an excellent
vehicle” for teaching some of the most critical skills that lawyers need to
become successful practitioners.22 The study of legal history, he argued, teaches
law students how to develop comprehensive and well-grounded “narratives”
and how to shape those narratives in the most persuasive manner possible “to
advance the causes of their clients.”23
In line with those efforts, this essay explores the question of legal history’s
practical value, and it does so by considering in greater detail what we can
learn from but one of its many diverse sub-fields.
II. Court-Centered Legal History
Court-centered legal history focuses on courts, judges, judge-made law,
and the processes of judicial decision-making.24 It does not seek to examine
legislative actions, administrative operations, executive enforcement efforts,
or the social, political, cultural, and economic forces that shape forms and
patterns of “legal” and legally related behavior. Studies in all those areas have
their own distinctive values and teach their own distinctive lessons.25 Although
21.

Robert M. Jarvis et al., Contextual Thinking: Why Law Students (and Lawyers) Need to Know History,
42 Wayne L. Rev. 1603 (1996).

22.

William E. Nelson, Why the Study of History Matters: Especially in Law School, 2 (draft article)(on file
with author).

23.

Id. at 18.

24.

Since the path-breaking work of Willard Hurst, American legal history has moved away
from narrow court-centered studies to pursue far wider and more varied approaches that
explore the complex interrelationships between “legal” phenomena broadly considered and
“non-legal” social, political, economic, and cultural forces. For Hurst’s contributions, see, e.g.,
James Willard Hurst, Law and Social Order in the United States (1977); James Willard
Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in
Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (1964); James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The
Law Makers (1950), [hereinafter Growth of American Law]. For discussions of Hurst’s
impact on the field, see, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst, Engaging Willard Hurst: A Symposium, 18 Law &
Hist. Rev. 1 (2000); Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law
Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 Law & Soc’y Rev. 9 (1975); and Harry N. Scheiber,
At the Borderland of Law and Economic History: The Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 Am. Hist. Rev.
744 (1969). For a discussion of the ways that legal history’s “social” inquiries have expanded
beyond the primarily economic and market/regulatory issues that Hurst emphasized to give
greater attention to such fundamental social factors as race, class, gender, and sexuality, see
e.g., Barbara Y. Welke, Willard Hurst and the Archipelago of American Legal Historiography, 18 Law &
Hist. Rev. 197 (2000).

25.

Thus, the values and uses of legal history are far broader and more numerous than those
discussed in this essay. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution
(2013); Noel Maurer, The Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to
Protect American Property Overseas, 1893-2013 (2013); Jonathan Levy, Freaks of
Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (2012); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years
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court-centered legal history must draw heavily on available scholarship in all
of those areas as well as in all other fields of relevant scholarly inquiry,26 it
retains its own primary focus on courts, judges, and judicial decision-making.
Within its delimited field, moreover, court-centered legal history does not
seek to produce normative conclusions. Thus, it does not include what has
been called “law office” or “forensic” history, the use of historical materials
to support predetermined and result-driven legal conclusions. Nor does it
include those varieties of “originalism” that seek to use historical materials
to establish the pedigree and authority of currently useful constitutional
propositions. Nor, finally, does it include technical studies of legal doctrines
that use historical materials simply to trace technical changes in the formal
content of legal rules.
Instead, court-centered legal history asks and attempts to answer strictly
“historical” questions about certain matters classified as “legal.” Its goal
is only to understand and explain what occurred, when it occurred, why it
occurred, and what consequences the examined actions or events helped bring
about. This type of legal history aims not to win lawsuits, identify “correct”
legal rules, or establish normative propositions. It seeks only to understand
and explain, and its goal—in the language of much social science literature—is
“positive” rather than “normative.”27
American Administrative Law (2012); Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight:
The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (2009); Pippa
Holloway, Sexuality, Politics, and Social Control in Virginia, 1920-1945 (2006); James
M. Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence
Agencies (2005); Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and
the Nostalgia Trap (1992). For recent general considerations of the relationship between
law and history, see Hendrik Hartog, Introduction to Symposium on Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories”:
Robert W. Gordon. 1984. Critical Legal Histories, Stan. L. Rev. 36:57-125, 37 Law & Soc. Inquiry
147 (2012); “Law As….”: Theory and Method in Legal History, 1 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 519 (2011);
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57 (1984); and for a measured and
somewhat skeptical assessment of history’s contributions to law, see Christopher Tomlins,
Review Essay—The Consumption of History in the Legal Academy: Science and Synthesis, Perils and Prospects,
61 J. Legal Ed. 139 (2011).
of

26.

Court-centered legal history must be informed by all relevant kinds of legal, historical, and
social scientific studies that cast light on the work of courts and the processes of judicial
reasoning and decision-making. E.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism:
A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251 (1997) (importance of
political science “attitudinal” studies in understanding judicial behavior). Its practitioners
must always bear in mind Hurst’s warning to “beware the subtle bias which arbitrarily
truncates its proper subject matter by identifying it simply with the products of courts and
lawsuits.” James Willard Hurst, Justice Holmes on Legal History 93 (1964). The work
of courts and judges can be fully and most fruitfully understood only when placed in its
full and proper social context. E.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and
Social Movements, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 927 (2006) (influence of broad social movements on legal
developments).

27.

The fact that this type of court-centered legal history disclaims normative goals does not
mean that it purports to be wholly “objective.” It readily acknowledges the frailties of
human reason, the complexities of judicial behavior, the inadequacies of historical sources
and methods, and the fact that personal factors may influence the interpretations of its
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The non-normative nature of this kind of legal history unavoidably raises—
indeed, spotlights—another more specific question that legal educators must
also ask. What is the utility of such court-centered history? What is the practical
value of such a field when—by definition—its analyses and conclusions fail to
claim normative authority? This essay attempts to answer that question by
exploring the idea that this type of legal history is a paradoxical enterprise
and that recognizing its paradoxical nature illuminates the substantial
contributions it makes to our understanding of law and the actual work of
courts and lawyers, contributions that establish its essential place in a full and
sound legal education.28
III. Paradoxes of Court-Centered Legal History
Cardozo puzzled over the “unending paradoxes”29 he found in the law’s
function of resolving human conflicts and accommodating society’s need for
both stability and change.30 His paradoxes, however, reflected the inherently
normative function of law and the judicial process,31 and consequently his
paradoxes cannot be the paradoxes of a non-normative legal history. Those
quite different paradoxes arise from legal history’s core inquiry into the
complex forces—social and extralegal as well as formal and legal—that explain
the actual nature of legal processes, judicial decision-making, and the course
of judge-made law.
More particularly, the paradoxes of court-centered legal history arise
from two seemingly contradictory facts. The first is that such legal history
challenges and rejects the ideal image of judicial decision-making as wholly
logical, impersonal, rule-directed, and autonomous.32 The second is that it
practitioners. See, e.g., Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity” Question
and the American Historical Profession (1988). This type of legal history seeks only
to produce the best account possible of events and developments that the full range of
historical sources—and the full panoply of available analytical tools—will fairly support.
Such “best accounts” can range from those that seem as certain as wholly consistent and
substantial amounts of evidence will sometimes permit to those that are—in descending
order of relative confidence—quite convincing, or relatively persuasive, or plausible but
contested, or only possible and speculative.
28.

“Students didn’t like the [legal history] course,” Hurst noted near the end of his career and
after teaching the subject for more than forty years. “It wasn’t a law course in their point of
view, and yet in later years time and time again the students would come back to me and
say, in law school I didn’t know what the devil that [course] was all about, but now that
they were out and into practice, they thought it was the best one that they had in school.”
Hendrik Hartog, Snakes in Ireland: A Conversation with Willard Hurst, 12 Law & Hist. Rev. 370,
378-79 (1994).

29.

Cardozo, supra note 4, at 134.

30.

Id. at 6, 56, 86.

31.

“Our concern for the moment is with the work of judges only. … Where doubt enters in,
there enters the judicial function.” Id. at 10.

32.

Cardozo surely agreed with that proposition. “[I]f there is anything of reality in my analysis
of the judicial process, they [judges] do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights;
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serves as an invaluable guide for understanding, evaluating, and potentially
improving legal processes and real-world judicial decision-making. The root
of legal history’s paradoxical nature, then, lies in the fact that for law and the
judicial process it is both acutely subversive and profoundly supportive.
In 1903, W.E.B. DuBois identified what he called the “double-consciousness”
of American blacks. To ensure their own safety, blacks had to understand
themselves in the prevailing racist terms and roles that the dominant white
society imposed. To save their own humanity, they had to understand
themselves on their own terms as full and independent human beings. That
“double-consciousness,” DuBois wrote, created “two warring ideals in one
dark body.”33 This essay suggests that the special values of court-centered
legal history arise from an analogous “double consciousness”—the field’s
understanding and integration of two other warring ideals, legal formalism
and historical realism. Legal history recognizes that both formal internal
constraints and external social pressures shape judicial decision-making, and
it shows that those internal and external elements are closely, if complexly and
contingently, related.34 Ultimately, it teaches that the ideal of a wholly neutral,
logical, and principled judicial decision-making is beyond human capacity
but that the ideal nonetheless possesses incalculable value as an inspiring and
partially attainable goal. This “double consciousness” lies at the heart of legal
history’s paradoxical nature, and it inspires its most enduring insights and
practical contributions.
A. The Paradox of Method
The first paradox is one of flat contradiction. Legal history assembles
evidence, inspires insights, and supports conclusions that are precisely the
kinds of contributions that formal legal reasoning seeks to minimize, ignore,
or deny.35 Claiming to apply pre-existing rules and principles, striving to
and we shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The great tides
and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the
judges by.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (1921).
33.

W. E. B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk 5 (1903).

34.

Legal historians, of course, often disagree over the relative significance of internal and
external factors when addressing specific issues at specific times. E.g., Edward A. Purcell,
Jr., National League of Cities: Judicial Decision-making and the Nature of Constitutional Federalism, 91
Denver U. L. Rev. Online 179 (2014). Compare, e.g., the views in Symposium, The Debate Over
the Constitutional Revolution of 1937, 110 J. Am. Hist. 1046 (2005); Barry Cushman, Rethinking
The New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (1998); and
two reviews of Cushman’s book: Richard D. Friedman, Taking Decisions Seriously: A Review
of Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution, 24 J. Sup. Ct. Hist.
314 (1999) and William Lasser, Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937—Was There a
“Switch in Time?” 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1347 (2000). See generally Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous
is Law? 3 Ann. Rev. Law & Soc. Sci. 45 (2007).

35.

Legal reasoning and judicial decision-making have commonly paid attention to practical
concerns and consequences, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legalistic Reasoning—a Footnote to
Weber, 1966 Wisc. L. Rev. 148, and it may be that the opinions of American judges in the 20th
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follow a rigorously logical method, and projecting an aura of certainty and
authority, formal legal reasoning minimizes or avoids whenever possible the
social, the pragmatic, and the transient.36 When considering such phenomena,
it purports to subordinate them to the controlling authority of strictly “legal”
rules and principles. Above all, formal legal reasoning denies the relevance
of anything that smacks of the personal, political, subjective, or ideological.37
Thus, the norms of formal legal reasoning are antithetical to the insights of
legal history.
Beyond appealing to bland generalities about past events, formal legal
reasoning commonly erases actual historical contexts and ignores their
practical significance. John Marshall’s constitutional decisions invoked text,
structure, and general principles, but his particular conclusions stemmed
in large part not from those sources but from the practical lessons he drew
from his own frustrating experiences as an officer in the Revolutionary Army
and then as a member of the Virginia Legislature. The severe hardships that
plagued Washington’s army, Marshall came to believe, were the fault of
thirteen discordant states with their petty jealousies and selfish policies, a
debilitating condition that only a strong central government could remedy.38
and early 21st century have grown more overtly pragmatic and “policy-oriented.” E.g., Brian
Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 469
(2007). The focus in the text, however, is on “formal” or “legalistic” judicial reasoning and
on the fact that such reasoning purposely and methodically ignores the possible influence
of personal, political, subjective, or ideological factors on the decision-making process. As
used here, the term “formal” has a broader meaning than the term “formalistic” as that latter
term is often used to describe a style of legal reasoning purportedly typical of the late 19th
century. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787 (1989);
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
36.

A strictly “legalist theory of judging” is “the judiciary’s ‘official’ theory of judicial behavior.”
Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 41 (2008). “[M]ost judges are cagey, even coy, in
discussing what they do. They tend to parrot an official line about the judicial process (how
rule bound it is), and often to believe it, though it does not describe their actual practices.”
Id. at 2.

37.

Consider, e.g., two Supreme Court decisions dealing with an ostensibly technical procedural
issue, the standard for granting summary judgment. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970), adopted a standard that made it relatively difficult for defendants to obtain summary
judgment, while sixteen years later Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), set forth a standard
that made summary judgment easier to obtain. The standards the two cases applied were
inconsistent. As a matter of history, Adickes and Celotex are quite different cases, presenting
different issues, arising in different contexts, and decided by ideologically different Courts.
Adickes can be fully understood only as the product of a liberal Court sensitive to civil rights
cases from the South in the 1960s, while Celotex can be fully understood only as the product
of a conservative Court seeking in the 1980s to expand the ability of defendants to obtain
summary judgment. As a matter of “law,” however, the Court has officially pronounced
the two cases consistent. Adickes, the Celotex Court declared, was correctly decided. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325. The Court banished both the social context and the animating individual
factors that shaped the decisions in both cases in order to affirm a nonexistent consistency,
uniformity, and principled neutrality in “the law.”

38.

R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall
(2001).
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Roger B. Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott claimed its foundation in the original
intention of the Founders, but his views were shaped by his personal embrace
of racism, slavery, and the plantation system of the South.39 The Court’s late19th-century decisions validating the post-Reconstruction settlement invoked
the Fourteenth Amendment and a variety of other legal and constitutional
“principles,” but they were animated by the political and racial beliefs that the
Justices shared with most of the nation’s white population.40 The desegregation
decisions of the Warren Court were based on the Equal Protection Clause, but
they were inspired by demographic movements, changing views about race,
and the Cold War demands of American foreign policy.41
Legal history’s incompatibility with formal legal reasoning is apparent
even in relatively technical areas. In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman
Co., for example, the Supreme Court established a “doctrine of abstention”
supported by a variety of arguments based on principles of federalism and
equity jurisprudence.42 Subsequently, the federal courts cited and applied
that doctrine in light of those principles, even though historical materials
suggest quite clearly that the decision was driven by unmentioned practical
considerations rather than logical conclusions from legal principles. In fact,
the Court in Pullman confected an ostensibly “principled” rationale in order to
avoid making a decision that would either disregard constitutional principles
of racial equality or infuriate the South and possibly divide the nation on the
eve of American entry into World War II.43 The decision and its doctrine were
the product of two powerful social considerations: first, an intensely felt need
39.

Christopher I. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism’s Forgotten Past, 10 Const. Comment. 37
(1993). As one legal historian put it with delicacy, Taney’s “most controversial judicial
opinions, beginning with Dred Scott, were influenced by his southern heritage.” James F.
Simon, Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney: Slavery, Secession, and the President’s War
Powers 271 (2006).

40.

See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law,
Race, History, and ‘Federal Courts’, 81 N. C. L. Rev. 1927, 1981-2038 (2003).

41.

E.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race
Democracy 12-17 (2000).

42.

Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).

43.

The action involved an effort by the Pullman Company and a number of railroads to enjoin
enforcement of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission that required a “conductor” (all
of whom were white) to be aboard every sleeping car where a “porter” (all of whom were
black) was working. Thus, the order ensured that there would be a white man on every car
where a black man was present and a white woman was sleeping. The companies sought
to cut their costs; the conductors intervened to support increased jobs; and the porters
intervened to protest racial discrimination. A judgment on the merits would either reject
the claim of racial discrimination or invalidate the commission’s order. The Court’s opinion
was brief, but it nonetheless hinted obliquely at the informing context. It acknowledged
that the porters presented a “more than substantial” constitutional issue, noted that the case
“touches a sensitive area of social policy,” and backed away from addressing the state-law
issue presented by characterizing the members of the Court with the label that Southerners
used to de-legitimate Northerners who “intruded” into Southern racial matters. The Justices,
Pullman explained, were “outsiders” to Texas law. 312 U.S. at 498, 499.
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to maintain national unity in the face of a frightening and ever-nearing world
war and, second, an acute wariness over the divisive nature and explosive
potential of a decision invalidating a law deeply rooted in racial antipathy and
in what W. J. Cash termed the South’s obsessive interracial “rape complex.44
The Court’s opinion—and hence its formal “doctrine of abstention”—gave only
the most oblique hints about the actual grounds of its decision, and subsequent
legal arguments and judicial opinions never mention the historical factors that
gave birth to “the Pullman doctrine.” As a matter of “law” and formal legal
reasoning, its historical origins are not only irrelevant but embarrassing.
Consider another example drawn from an even more arcane area. In Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York45 the Court applied an “outcome determination” test and held
that, in contested “procedural” choice-of-law issues under the Erie doctrine,46
state law should be applied if the application of federal law could alter the
outcome of a case. For twenty years thereafter the Court applied that test and
gave broad sway to state law.47 Subsequently, when the Court decided in Hanna
v. Plumer to abandon “outcome determination” and apply a different test that
would drastically shrink the sway of state law, it blandly reinterpreted York’s
progeny and claimed that those cases had been decided consistently with the
new and different test.48 After that, proper legal analysis necessarily tracked
the Court’s formulations in Hanna and accepted the proposition that the cases
decided under York were fully consistent with the new approach.49 To do so,
lawyers and judges were compelled to elide the explicit reasoning in those
earlier York-based cases. To acknowledge their actual reasoning would serve
44.

W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South 114-17 (Vintage 1991)(1941)(quote at 115 & 117). The
fear of a coming war within the Court—especially the fear of Pullman’s author, Justice
Felix Frankfurter—is described in Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses:
Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution Ch. 2 (2000). Archival
materials support the conclusion that the majority opinion was a compromise and suggests,
at a minimum, that Chief Justice Hughes had serious doubts about abstention and that
Justices Reed and perhaps Douglas joined the opinion with some reluctance. See Charles
Evans Hughes to Felix Frankfurter, Feb. 20, 1941, Felix Frankfurter Papers (Harvard
Law School), Part I, reel 2; Hughes’ “return” (“I acquiesce”), id.; Reed’s “return” (“I agree
with a half-suffused regret that the formula might not be more precise”), id.; and Douglas’
“return” (“I am not so clear in the point as others”), id. Further, Douglas’ return suggests
that he was aware that the Court was finessing a delicate social and political matter. “I think
the opinion puts us into safe waters with clear sailing.” Id. See generally Lauren Robel, Riding
the Color Line: The Story of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., in Federal Court Stories
(Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010), 163-89.

45.

326 U.S. 99 (1945).

46.

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

47.

Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).

48.

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).

49.

Interestingly, the law in this area may be changing once again. Compare Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 with Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) and Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
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no useful “legal” purpose and would only confuse and clutter the minds of
lawyers and judges.
Formal legal reasoning, then, commonly allows little or no role for the actual
historical forces that informed and often determined legal decisions and their
doctrinal formulations. Indeed, in one recent case, five Justices excoriated a
dissenter for even raising such historical evidence in questioning the weight and
significance of allegedly controlling precedents. Such an “undocumented and
highly speculative extralegal explanation,” Chief Justice William Rehnquist
wrote for a majority, was “a disservice to the Court’s traditional method of
adjudication.”50
For legal reasoning and judicial decision-making, then, legal history serves
as an unwanted and disruptive intruder. It is Banquo’s Ghost at MacBeth’s
banquet. Its virtue, nonetheless, remains, for it shows that legal reasoning does
not necessarily explain judicial decision-making, and that far different and
more important forces may lie behind any case or doctrine. Indeed, Banquo’s
Ghost was unwelcome for compelling reasons: It evidenced both a welldeserved guilty conscience and the decisive importance of matters occurring
far beyond the banquet room. Thus, in challenging the relatively closed world
of formal legal reasoning, legal history may generate useful new insights into
the actual weight and potential flexibility of legal doctrines, insights that may
deepen understanding of their purposes, implicit limits, and possible creative
applications in the future.
B. The Paradox of Understanding
The second paradox is that court-centered legal history undermines the
ideal images of constitutionalism and “the rule of law” while at the same time
it inspires a sounder appreciation of the true qualities and possibilities of
both.51 Consider in their American setting the counterpoised and conflicting
contributions that court-centered legal history makes to those cognate
concepts.
In terms of the ideal images, court-centered legal history is destructive.
While recognizing that the Constitution created an elaborate structure
of government and ordained the primacy of certain fundamental values, it
demonstrates that the Constitution’s textual generalities, ambiguities, and
lacunae provided little or no direction for “correct” resolutions to countless
numbers of live controversies that arose over the years. It shows that from
the nation’s beginning constitutional interpretations were shaped not only
50.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1996). The target was Justice Souter,
writing for himself and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, who argued that an understanding of
the historical background of the Court’s late-19th-century decisions construing the Eleventh
Amendment provided a reason to construe those decisions narrowly. Id. at 116-23 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).

51.

For a discussion of the various meanings attributed to the concept of “rule of law,” see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev.
1 (1997).
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by textual provisions and shared values but by evolving social conditions,
changing practical challenges, sharply conflicting interests, realigning political
coalitions, and shifting ideological currents.52 It shows, more particularly,
that the Supreme Court frequently invented or remolded the meaning of
constitutional provisions and that its Justices were commonly influenced and
sometimes driven by their personal views and values.53 It shows how and why
American law has over time expanded judicial discretion and thus opened
up more areas where such personal views and values might influence the law
and judicial decision-making.54 It shows, too, that both constitutionalist and
“rule-of-law” ideas have sometimes served dubious and unjust purposes and
that order and regularity have not necessarily meant fairness, benevolence, or
genuine legal equality.55 Indeed, it shows that a “rule of law” may be a social
and cultural phenomenon only tangentially or even oppositionally related to
formal legal rules and institutions.56 Legal history thus shows that the substance
52.

See, e.g., Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the
Constitution in Modern America (2010); Purcell, supra note 15; Gordon S. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Univ. of N.C. Press, 1998)(1969); Jack N.
Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making Of the Constitution
(1996); Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise or
Constitutional Interpretation? in Origins of the Federal Judiciary: Essays on the Judiciary
Act of 1789, 13-39 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). For studies of the origins of judicial review, see,
e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More
out of Less, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 787 (1999); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A
Plea for New Contexts, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1031 (1997).

53.

See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion has Influenced
The Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (2009) (influence of
public opinion on the Court); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Understanding Curtiss-Wright, 31 Law
& Hist. Rev. 653 (2013) (influence of personal views and values on major constitutional
decision). Social science studies confirm these conclusions. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The
Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
(2013); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Judiciary (2006); Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court
and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002).

54.

E.g., William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal
Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (1975); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 909 (1987).

55.

E.g., Peters, supra note 44; Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical
Interpretation (1987); Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavary and the Judicial
Process (1975). On the varied and shifting social consequences of constitutionalism and
the “rule of law,” see, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86
Yale L. J. 561 (1976) and Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Morton Horwitz Wrestles with
the Rule of Law, in 2 Transformations in American Legal History: Law, Ideology, and
Methods, Esssays in Honor of Morton J. Horwitz 483-99 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred
L. Brophy eds., 2010)[hereinafter Transformations].

56.

For a striking example of the social and cultural bases of law, see Laura F. Edwards, The
People and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the
Post-Revolutionary South (2009); Laura F. Edwards, The Peace: The Meaning and Production of
Law in the Post-Revolutionary United States, 1 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 565 (2011).
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of the nation’s constitutionalism and its operative “rule of law” evolved over
time, fell well short of the ideal, and changed with social pressures, political
conflicts, and the shifting and subjective value judgments of its judges.57 It
shows, in other words, that the ideals are partial and misconceived, that they
do not necessarily equate to justice and equality, and that they cannot mean
the automatic, predetermined, and essentially “logical” application of clear,
known, and established rules.58
Conversely, by revealing the practical conditions and social complexities
that underlie those ideals, court-centered legal history is constructive. It shows
that a vital and regularized constitutionalism and “rule of law” existed in the
United States, that legal rules and principles channeled and often directed
judicial decision-making, and that the nation’s legal system brought many
beneficial results to American society. It shows, too, how and in what ways
constitutionalism and a “rule of law” were enabled by complex social, political,
cultural, economic, and institutional underpinnings that gave different levels
of support and helped produce different degrees of order, justice, equality, and
predictability. Legal history, in other words, helps us to think critically and
intelligently about what is possible in terms of implementing constitutionalist
and “rule-of-law” ideals and consequently how those ideals can be more fully
and effectively achieved in practice.
Further, court-centered legal history helps clarify our thinking by showing
that there is no single or absolute “rule of law” but many different kinds of
“rules of law” that may be relatively acceptable and legitimate. All require
such basic elements as fairness, neutrality, consistency, and generality,59 but the
nature of their rules, the extent of their predictability, and the relative propriety
of their administration varies with the nature of the practical and interpretive
tasks that various lawmakers and decision—makers confront.60 Regulating
automobile traffic and arranging intestate succession give rise to different
operative “rules of law,” as do honoring private agreements and enforcing
criminal laws. More fundamentally, all of those diverse areas give rise to “rules
of law” different from the “rules of law” that exist when the Supreme Court
applies the Constitution. There are different constitutional “rules of law”
57.

“The spirit of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group in
which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place.”
Cardozo, supra note 32, at 174-75. For examples of such changes by a supposedly highly
“formalistic” and “principled” judge, Justice George Sutherland, see Stephen A. Siegel, The
Constitution on Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning,
52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 373 (2012); Purcell, supra note 53, at 679-86.

58.

“The rule of law,” then, cannot mean “the law of rules.” Compare Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989). At least for judgments made by multi-judge
courts, public choice theory supports this conclusion as a matter of logical necessity. See,
e.g., Leo Katz, Why the Law is so Perverse (2011) (exploring legal implications of Arrow’s
Theorem and public choice theory for decisions involving “multicriterial” considerations).

59.

Such as, for example, the characteristics outlined in Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law
33-94 (1969).

60.

See, e.g., Hurst, Growth of American Law, supra note 24.
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depending on the nature of the constitutional values and provisions at issue.
Those values and provisions can range from the relatively clear or specific to
the general and open-ended; from those whose applications are relatively new,
fluid, or uncertain to those whose applications are largely circumscribed by
long-standing legal precedents, institutional conditions, or ingrained social
practices; and from those whose interpretations seem sound and satisfactory to
those whose interpretations must be reshaped to meet newly arising challenges
or radically altered social conditions and demands.61
Indeed, legal history shows that there are even different operative “rules
of law” on the same issues and in the same legal system.62 Trial judges and
judicial districts differ in many ways, and their rulings in “like” cases may
differ in treatment and result.63 Inconsistent rulings or results often stand
because appellate courts have limited capacities and often apply deferential
standards of review.64 Creating even more diversity, trial court decisions on
“preliminary” issues unrelated to the “merits” often determine that cases will
settle and fix their general settlement value, and such “preliminary” rulings are
seldom reviewed by higher courts.65 Similarly, intermediate appellate courts
have their own realms of discretion, in significant part because the chance
that their decisions will be reviewed—especially in the federal system—is
61.

Consider, for example, the contrasting roles the Supreme Court has taken in construing
the Constitution’s provisions concerning private property and its provisions concerning the
foreign-affairs powers of the executive. The former has inspired a multitude of decisions
providing authoritative precedents and detailed rules; the latter but a scattering of cautious
and largely inconclusive opinions. See, e.g., Mariah Zeisberg, War Powers: The Politics
of Constitutional Authority (2013); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United
States Constitution 2-5 (1996). Most extreme, the Court has in effect declared some parts
of the Constitution judicially unenforceable. E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (Incompatibility Clause of Art. I); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (Statements and Accounts Clause of Art. I).

62.

See, e.g., C. K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and Judgments in Federal District
Courts 154 (1996); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on
Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 L. & Soc. Inquiry 679, 716-19, 722-26, 733-34 (1999); Frank
B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing
on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L. J. 2155 (1998).

63.

See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We
Care? 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 111 (2009) (significant differences in settlement rates in four
categories of cases between two federal districts, one in Pennsylvania and one in Georgia).

64.

See e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 103 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation
Realities Renewed, in Empirical Studies of Judicial Systems: 2008 35, 98-99 (Kuo-Chang
Huang, ed., 2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate
Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 947 (2003); and
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage,
3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 125 (2001). But see Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1995).

65.

E.g., Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment
Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 175, 194-96 (2010).
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slight.66 Finally, state supreme courts—and most especially the United States
Supreme Court—have greater control over their dockets, deal with more
open-ended questions, and are often able to change the law or reorient its
social consequences through a wide variety of largely discretionary doctrinal
tools.67 Thus, a somewhat different “rule of law” may control “like” cases in
the same legal system depending on the nature of their respective trial judges,
whether the cases settle or go to final judgment, whether they are heard by an
appellate court, and ultimately whether they reviewed by a state supreme court
or the United States Supreme Court. Understanding that such variations,
contingencies, and inconsistencies exist in the legal system—and learning how
to use them to best advantage—is absolutely essential to the work of practicing
lawyers.
Most generally, court-centered legal history also teaches how Americans
managed—and sometimes failed to manage—the structural tensions the
Constitution established for balancing power with power, stability with
adaptability, and principles with pragmatism. It highlights the crucial issues
and institutional danger points that threatened and may continue to threaten
the system’s stability, security, and even legitimacy.68 In this sense its paradoxes
are the paradoxes of American constitutionalism itself.69
By showing that a desirable and working constitutionalism and “rule of
law” have not ultimately depended on pre-existing rules and authorities,
court-centered legal history joins with other types of legal history to teach
66.

At the beginning of the 21st century the federal circuit courts were divided on more than a
thousand issues of federal law, while the Supreme Court reviewed far less than one percent of
their decisions. Purcell, supra note 15, at 132. Compare, e.g., In re Nassau County Strip Search
Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) with Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734
(5th Cir. 1996) (applying substantially different interpretations of Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P.).
In the federal system “so few court of appeals decisions are reviewed by the Supreme Court
(currently less than 1 percent) that the threat of reversal cannot be much of a constraint…”
Posner, supra note 36, at 143. See Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court
Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 457 (2012).

67.

“The higher levels of the judiciary, culminating in the Supreme Court, are where a great deal
of law is made, to be administered (albeit with imperfect fidelity) in mostly legalist fashion
by the lower courts.” Posner, supra note 36, at 45. See, e.g., Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence
to Precedent, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 369 (2005).

68.

Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power
After Watergate (2006); James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of
Congress (1981); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (1973). The
judicial structure and evolving practices under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
raise serious questions in this regard. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Roberts’s Picks Reshaping Secret
Surveillance Court, N.Y. Times, July 26, 2013, at A-1; Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens
Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. Times, July 7, 2013, at A-1.

69.

The practice of judicial review, for example, has seemed paradoxical to many. See, e.g., Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five,
112 Yale L. J. 153 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333 (1998). See generally Philip Hamburger, Law
and Judicial Duty (2008).
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a hard but invaluable lesson.70 They teach lawyers—and all Americans—their
ultimate challenge as citizens: first, that they cannot rely on institutional
structures, constitutional text, or general principles to ensure the satisfactory
operation of their legal and political system; and, second, that they must
address their differences and make their public choices with decency,
forbearance, and mutual understanding. Ultimately, legal history suggests
that tolerance, basic fairness, and the willingness to compromise are essential
to maintain the nation’s democratic constitutionalism, while at the same time
it acknowledges that compromise is an art that can be onerous, wrenching,
and sometimes excruciating to practice.71 Thus, legal history shows that the
American constitutional system—however much its institutions and values may
channel and guide—rests ultimately on an enduring existential challenge, and
it counsels the ultimate wisdom of democratic constitutionalism: that citizens
must define themselves—and then act—in ways that promote an inclusive,
ordered, decent, and just governmental system that allows all to participate
and all to benefit.
Such a teaching may be disappointing or disturbing, sharply doubted or
flatly rejected. It surely fails to provide any specific normative direction and
equally surely fails to resolve any particular legal controversy. Most unnerving,
it casts off all assurances, certainties, and guarantees.72 It is, nonetheless,
essential for understanding and maintaining the nation’s “rules of law” and
its democratic constitutionalism. The teaching fully, if sadly, confirms the
lesson that both Madison and Hamilton drew from the founding, the painful
recognition that making constitutional self-government work successfully is
truly an “arduous” enterprise.73
C. The Paradox of Normativity
The third paradox is that court-centered legal history, though claiming no
capacity to justify normative rules and doctrines, can nonetheless aid normative
70.

One scholar has drawn a similar lesson from the history of the relationship between
democratic theory and scientific inquiry. The significance of science for democratic
government is a matter of interpretation and “its present political impact remains up to us.”
Andrew Jewett, Science, Democracy, and the American University: From the Civil
War to the Cold War 374 (2012).

71.

On the ambiguities and complexities of compromise in American constitutionalism, see, e.g.,
Cover, supra note 55; Lichtblau, supra note 69; Compromise and Constitutionalism: A Symposium
Based on Sanford Levinson’s 2010 Brandeis Lecture, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 813 (2011).

72.

Some may believe that these conclusions show that this type of court-centered legal history
is solely destructive and ultimately nihilistic. Acceptance of naive and unchastened ideals of
constitutionalism and a “rule of law,” however, masks the truth and conflicts with the most
basic principles of open and reasoned democracy. In the long run it simply saps the vitality
of a just and intelligent constitutionalism.

73.

The Federalist No. 37, at 228 (Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1937), (speaking of
resolving problems of constitutional federalism); No. 85, at 574 (Hamilton) (speaking of the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution).
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reasoning in numerous ways.74 It highlights the importance of changing ideas
about the nature and limitations of the judicial role, illuminates the significance
of shifts in the allocation of jurisdiction among various decision-making
institutions, and identifies the social underpinnings and practical operations
of the law’s rules and doctrines.75 It deepens our understanding of what courts
and judges can wisely and effectively do in addressing a wide range of diverse
issues in an even wider range of social contexts.76 It helps clear the ground
for sound normative judgments by penetrating through abstractions and
identifying the social conditions and anticipated consequences that informed
judicial decisions. It unearths and offers lessons from a nearly infinite number
of prior cases that constitute, in effect, social experiments in which courts
sought to resolve practical problems, at least for a time, by articulating
seemingly reasonable rules and applying them logically to particular sets of
facts.77 Only when we understand all of the relevant factors in a case and all
the consequences that followed its resolution can we soundly determine its
relative wisdom in the circumstances of a particular dispute or its desirability
as a precedent to be applied to new and contemporary sets of facts.
Further, court-centered legal history highlights an often unrecognized
practical danger that lurks in the law’s formal reasoning and its method of
purifying cases and doctrines by stripping them of their historical contexts.
On one hand, the law’s purifying method is essential for the development of a
rational and ordered system of law based on known precedents and rules. On
the other hand, that purifying process can make those rules and precedents
so general and abstract that over time they become ever more vulnerable to
reinterpretation, redefinition, and manipulation.78 Whether courts intended
changes or simply failed to recognize the changes their decisions entailed,
they frequently decided cases and articulated doctrines in ways that altered the
74.

Most thoughtful biographies of Supreme Court Justices teach the complexities of
constitutional issues, the often subtle role of personal values, and the ultimate importance
of wise practical judgment. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life (2009);
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Biography (2001); Newmyer, supra
note 37; Kaufman, Cardozo, supra note 6; Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography
(1994); G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading
American Judges (1976); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the
Law (1946).

75.

See, e.g., Alfred S. Konefsky, Simon Greenleaf, Boston Elites, and the Social Meaning and Construction of
the Charles River Bridge Case, in Transformations, supra note 55, at 165-95.

76.

See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court
and the Struggle for Racial Equality (2004); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The
History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality
(1977).

77.

Consider, for example, the disruptive and ultimately unsuccessful efforts of the courts
to control labor activities by issuing injunctions. See William E. Forbath, Law and the
Shaping of the American Labor Movement (1991).

78.

See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111 (1997).
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practical significance of many legal rules and placed the law in service to new
and different social purposes.79 Thus, the law’s purifying method of securing
coherence and stability sometimes invited interpretative conflict, enabled
doctrinal change, and obscured new and sometimes radical changes in the
law’s social consequences. Legal history illuminates that process and opens
those changes to closer and more informed professional and public scrutiny.
By recognizing society’s infinitely varied complexities, moreover, legal
history uncovers surprising developments and connections. It can reveal
hidden biases—submerged assumptions about such human characteristics
as race, class, age, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation—that have been
embedded in legal concepts and categories.80 It can show not only how legal
rules and doctrines changed over the years but also the practical impact of
those changes: first, the extent to which doctrinal changes altered—or failed
to alter—relevant social practices, patterns, and values; and, second, the extent
to which changed social conditions in turn altered the practical consequences
that flowed or were expected to flow from those doctrinal changes.81 Indeed,
79.

E.g., Ian R. Macneil, American Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization,
Internationalization (1992) (Supreme Court decisions between 1967 and 1991 “constitute
a transformation of the [meaning of the United States Arbitration Act] worthy of the best of
medieval alchemists,” at 148, and the doctrinal result was “a product of the dynamics of the
legal system rather than of conscious judicial legislation,” at 173).

80.

E.g., Peter Charles Hoffer, Nation of Laws: America’s Imperfect Pursuit of Justice
(2010); Ariela J. Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell: A History of Race on Trial in
America (2008); Joana Schoen, Choice and Coercion: Birth Control, Sterilization,
and Abortion in Public Health and Welfare (2005); Martha Gardner, The Qualities of
a Citizen: Women, Immigration, and Citizenship, 1870-1965 (2005); Stephanie Coontz,
Marriage: A History (2005); Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women,
Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America (2001);
Hendrik Hartog, Man & Wife in America: A History (2000); Nancy Isenberg, Sex and
Citizenship in Antebellum America (1998); Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right
to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship (1998); Amy Dru Stanley,
From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage and the Market in the Age of
Slave Emancipation (1998); Ian Haney Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction
of Race (1996); Michael Grossberg, A Judgment for Solomon: The D’hautevelle
Case and Legal Experience in Antebellum America (1996); George Chauncey, Gay New
York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940
(1995); Peter W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the
Law in the Nineteenth-Century South (1995); Richard H. Chused, Private Acts in
Public Places: A Social History of Divorce in the Formative Era of American Family
Law (1994); Christopher Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American
Republic (1993); N. E.H. Hull, Female Felons (1987); Marylynn Salmon, Women and
the Law of Property in Early America (1986); Michael Grossberg, Governing the
Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America (1985); James B. Atleson,
Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (1983).

81.

E.g., Pamela Brandwein, Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction
(2011); Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (2007) There is a massive
literature exploring the social “impact” of judicial decisions. E.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg,
The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991); Stephen L.
Wasby, The Impact of the United States Supreme Court: Some Perspectives (1970).
Many studies also examine the extent to which lower courts follow and implement the rules
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legal history can show how rules and doctrines sometimes brought practical
results that were entirely unexpected or even contrary to the law’s formal
goals.82
Finally, court-centered legal history calls attention to a major—and usually
unmentioned or flatly denied—challenge that the law’s normative principles
confront, the fact that the social characteristics of parties often influence or even
determine the way that the law resolves disputes. Courts seldom discuss such
characteristics because they properly have no bearing on the way judges should
apply the law. Yet, as every good lawyer knows, the nature and characteristics
of the parties in any dispute can be of immense and often decisive significance.
The parties’ social characteristics can determine whether or not an action is
even brought 83 and, if it is, whether the party is represented by counsel, what
other parties are joined, where the action is filed, how it is litigated, whether
it is settled and if so on what terms, and sometimes—if it ends in a judicial
judgment—which party wins.84 In spite of the law’s ideal of “blind” justice, the
laid down by higher courts. J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal
Judges and School Desegregation (1961); Diana Kapiszewski and Matthew M. Taylor,
Compliance: Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Explaining Adherence to Judicial Rulings, 38 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 803 (2013).
82.

Catherine R. Albiston, Institutional Inequality and the Mobilization of the Family
and Medical Leave Act: Rights on Leave (2010); Gordon, supra note 53; Ira Katznelson,
When Affirmative Action was White (2005); Anna-Maria Marshall, Confronting
Sexual Harassment: The Law and Politics of Everyday Life (2005); William E. Nelson,
The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology in New York, 1920-1980 (2001);
Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern
Immigration Law (1995); Vivien Hart, Bound by Our Constitution: Women, Workers,
and the Minimum Wage (1994); Martha Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare
Rights Movement, 1960-1973 (1993); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality:
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial America, 1870-1958 Ch. 4 (1992); Macneil,
supra note 80; John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a
Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (1983); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 Cal. L.
Rev. 1323 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale
L. J. 2117 (1996).

83.

The overwhelming majority of injured individuals, for example, never take their claims
to court. E.g., Frank A. Sloan et al. Suing for Medical Malpractice (1993); David M.
Engel, Perception and Decision at the Threshold of Tort Law: Explaining the Infrequency of Claims, 62
DePaul L. Rev. 293 (2013); William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 631 (1980-81).

84.

See, e.g., Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, Justice in America: The Separate Realities of
Blacks and Whites (2010); David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion:
Law and Identity in the Life Stories of Americans with Disabilities, esp. 245-49
(2003); Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of
Victims (1988); Ellen Berrey et al., Situated Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness and Inequality
in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 Law & Soc’y Rev. 1 (2012); Rachel Kahn Best et
al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 Law &
Soc’y Rev. 991 (2011); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the
Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 Law & Soc’y Rev. 83 (2005); Devon W. Carbado
& Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 701 (2001); Carol Seron
et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results
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social character of the parties frequently determines the resolution of disputes.
Legal history illuminates and documents that troubling fact, and—under the
law’s own proclaimed norms—demands a remedy.
Thus, court-centered legal history provides bases for better evaluating
the wisdom of the law’s rules, the quality of its judicial decisions, and the
likely practical significance of proposed legal reforms. In spite of its nonnormative nature, it can serve as an invaluable means of testing the law’s
relative successes and failures in achieving its proclaimed goals and honoring
its heralded ideals. Nourishing critical inquiries into the law’s past and present
operations, it functions as a gadfly to the law’s conscience, identifying its
shortcomings and inspiring its improvement. Its comprehensive examination
of social and political contexts, moreover, is particularly suited to the norms
of constitutional democracies with their commitment to the values of an
informed citizenry and the need for transparency in lawmaking processes. It
is thus not only useful but essential for practicing attorneys who seek to fulfill
their professional obligations to improve the law and the legal system.
D. The Paradox of Subjectivity
The fourth paradox is that court-centered legal history, by illuminating
the subjectivity inherent in the judicial process, may help make that process
relatively less subjective and, hence, more faithful to the law’s formal principles,
purposes, and values. Further, by identifying areas of broad judicial discretion
and spotlighting the implicit value choices that animated judges and courts, it
may also help make judicial decisionmaking more transparent and less likely
to be covertly guided by subjective values.
Court-centered legal history shows that judges possess a significant range of
interpretive discretion, especially in construing legal authorities that are vague,
incomplete, or conflicting. It is precisely in exercising such discretion—often
in highly controversial and especially important cases—where the influence
of personal values may prove most compelling in shaping judicial reasoning
yet least apparent to judicial introspection. By highlighting the role of such
personal values in decisionmaking, legal history can serve an enlightening
prophylactic function.85
of a Randomized Experiment, 35 Law & Soc. Rev. 419 (2001); Catherine R. Albiston, The Rule of
Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 Law & Soc’y Rev. 869 (1999);
Cheryl Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender and the Institution of Property,
18 Cardozo L. Rev. 309 (1996); Virginia Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using
Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National
Origin, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 771 (1996); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon:
Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 423, 440-59 (1992);
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1119-20.
85.

Statistical studies of lower federal courts show that the ideology and personal values of
judges seem to influence cases only sometimes and that their impact is varied. See, e.g.,
Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Opinions, 6 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 213 (2009) (ideological effects notable in courts of appeals opinions
but not in district court opinions); Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing
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Consider how legal history’s contextual approach illuminates the salience
of the conflicting principles presented to the Court in Shelby County v. Holder, 86
a constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.87 The act was a
landmark of the Civil Rights Movement that helped ensure that minorities and
other disadvantaged groups were finally able to vote and then able to continue
to vote. The groups that benefited from the act’s protections tended to favor
Democratic candidates, and Republicans in a number of states began working
to cement their party in power by seeking to enact a variety of seemingly
neutral electoral devices that would, in practice, disproportionally discourage
Democratic voters or effectively deny them access to the polls.88 These were
precisely the kinds of laws that the Voting Rights Act was designed to prevent.
When Republican-controlled Shelby County in Alabama—a state with a long
history of racial discrimination—challenged the act, the paramount practical
significance of its action was apparent to all.89 Upholding the Act would deter,
limit, or defeat many Republican voter suppression efforts; voiding the Act
the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 715, 734
(2008) (ideological effects in criminal cases).
86.

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).

87.

For the history of the act and its historical and contemporary importance, see Gary May,
Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American
Democracy (2013); Tova Andrea Wang, The Politics of Voter Suppression: Defending
and Expanding Americans’ Right to Vote (2012).

88.

The Republican rationale is that they are trying to prevent voter fraud, an alleged problem
for which there is almost no evidence. Before the 2012 election, for example, Florida’s
Republican governor undertook a campaign purportedly directed at voter fraud. He
identified by name 182,000 possible non-citizen voters who should be struck from the voting
rolls. Subsequent investigations forced him to drop almost 180,000 of those names, cutting
the list to 2,600, only .014 percent of the total on his initial list. Then, further investigation
showed that most of those remaining were also citizens. Ultimately, the state identified
only 198 possible non-citizen voters, of whom fewer than 40 had actually voted illegally, an
infinitesimal .0002 percent of those originally named. Lizette Alvarez, Ruling Revives Florida
Efforts to Police Voters, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2013, at A-14. Similarly, attempting to support a law
requiring a photo ID to vote, Indiana could produce evidence of only one case of attempted
fraudulent voting, an attempt that had been prevented without the photo ID law. Further,
it could produce evidence of only nine suspected attempts—not one of which occurred in
Indiana—out of 400 million votes cast across the country in general elections since 2000.
Justin Levitt, Analysis of Alleged Voter Fraud in Briefs Supporting Crawford
Respondents (Brennan Center for Justice, New York, 2007) 1. For a careful examination
of the issue of “voter fraud,” see Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud (Brennan
Center for Justice, New York, 2007). For repeated Republican efforts to harass black elected
officials from the adoption of the act to the first decade of the 21st century, see George
Derek Musgrove, Rumor, Repression & Racial Politics: How the Harassment of
Black Elected Officials Shaped Post-Civil Rights America (2012).

89.

Luke Johnson, Mike Turzai, Pennsylvania GOP House Majority Leader: Voter ID Will Allow Mitt
Romney to Win State, Huffington Post (June 25, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/06/25/mike-turzai-voter-id_n_1625646.html. See, e.g., Wendy Weiser & Diana
Kasdan, Voting Law Changes: Election Update (Brennan Center for Justice, New York,
2012); Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, Voting Law Changes in 2012 (Brennan
Center for Justice, New York, 2011); May, supra note 87, at 241-54.
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would open the door to those efforts and encourage similar tactics in other
Republican-controlled states.90
In voiding the Act, the Court’s five conservative Justices made a free and
decisive choice between two constitutional principles that the social and
political context placed in de facto conflict, either of which could be used to
“logically” justify a decision in the case.91 They selected the principle capable
of voiding the Act, the principle that states are “equal” and should be treated
equally.92 They rejected the principle that would uphold the Act, the principle
that all citizens have a fundamental right to vote and that government should
protect rather than burden or deny that right. In an imaginary world without
social context or consequence—a world incapable of producing legal history—
the decision was “logical” and “principled.” In the real world of early 21st
century America—in the world where legal history is made—the decision was a
device that promised to open the floodgates for Republican voter suppression
laws and serve as a potentially powerful tool of party entrenchment. Neither

90.

A month after the Court’s decision in Shelby County, The New York Times reported that “State
officials across the South are aggressively moving ahead with new laws requiring voters
to show photo identification at the polls after the Supreme Court decision striking down
a portion of the Voting Rights Act.” It continued: “The Republicans who control state
legislatures throughout the region say such laws are needed to prevent voter fraud. But such
fraud is extremely rare, and Democrats are concerned that the proposed changes will make
it harder for many poor voters and members of minorities—who tend to vote Democratic—to
cast their ballots in states that once discriminated against black voters with poll taxes and
literacy tests.” Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. Times, July
6, 2013, at A-9. By March of 2014 nine states had passed new laws adopting a variety of
techniques to make it more difficult to vote. Steven Yaccino and Lizette Alvarez, New G.O.P.
Bid To Limit Voting in Swing States, N.Y. Times, March 30, 2014, at A-1, 16. See Trip Gabriel,
Pennsylvania Defends Law on ID for Voters, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2013, at A-10; Adam Liptak, U.S.
Asks Court to Limit Texas On Ballot Rules, N.Y. Times, July 26, 2013, at A-1. That Republicans
intend such laws to limit Democratic voter turnout seems confirmed by their parallel efforts
to weaken Democratic voting strength by methodical gerrymandering. After their victories
in the 2010 election, Republican-controlled state legislatures carefully redrew state electoral
districts to ensure maximum possible control of the U.S. House of Representatives. They
were quite successful. “Pennsylvania is an apt example. In 2012, Obama carried the state, and
the Democratic candidates for the state’s eighteen House seats got a de facto majority—50.3
percent. Yet despite that margin, they secured only five seats to Republicans’ thirteen.”
Andrew Hacker, 2014: Another Democratic Debacle? 61 N.Y. Rev. Books 32, 33 (Jan. 9, 2014).
Similarly, in 2012 Barack Obama won Ohio with 51 percent of the vote but gerrymandering
gave the Republicans 75 percent of the state’s delegation in the House. Elizabeth Drew,
The Stranglehold on Our Politics, 60 N.Y. Rev. Books 61 (Sept. 26, 2013). See Michael Barone,
Chuck McCutcheon et al., The Almanac of American Politics 2014 (2014).
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For the influence of personal factors on the contemporary Court, see Marcia Coyle, The
Roberts Court: The Struggle for the Constitution (2013); Jan Crawford Greenburg,
Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Control of the United
States Supreme Court (2007); and Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World
of the Supreme Court (2007).
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Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622-24 (2013).
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“logic” nor “principle” required the majority’s choice.93 As Cardozo so
incisively pointed out, in judicial decision-making the decisive issue is not the
quality of the logic set forth but “why and how the choice was made between
one logic and another.”94 By showing the ways in which subjective choices
93.

Indeed, to even make the principle of state equality “logically applicable” in the first place,
the majority had to reinterpret it and expand its reach substantially. The majority stretched
the principle from one that covered only “the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union” to
one that reached the far different issue of the constitutional power of Congress to create
“remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared” in the states. Shelby County,
133 S.C. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 32829 (1966) (emphasis added in Shelby County).

94.

Cardozo, supra note 32, at 41. The dismissive attitude of the conservative Justices toward
the fundamental right to vote in Shelby County stands in stark contrast to the Court’s earlier
commitment to the principle that the right to vote is “fundamental” and that devices possibly
impairing it are consequently subject to strict scrutiny. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). That dismissive attitude stands in even starker contrast to the
fervently solicitous attitude toward voting rights that three of the same Justices displayed in
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
		 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Shelby County, like the Court’s decisions
in the late-19th-century sanctioning the post-Reconstruction Settlement, was based
ultimately on the majority’s substantive political and social values. Indeed, at the
oral argument Justice Scalia echoed Justice Joseph Bradley’s sentiments more than
a century earlier in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). There, Bradley had declared:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he take the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the
special favorite of the law, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected
in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.
109 U.S. at 25.
Adopting a similar view, Justice Scalia charged that the congressional renewal of the
Voting Rights Act was “attributable to a phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial
entitlement.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby County v. Holder (Feb. 27, 2013).
Justice Scalia’s willingness to invalidate the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County
contrasts with his unwillingness the very next day to invalidate a statute bearing very
different political and social significance, the Defense of Marriage Act. There, in United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), he dissented and declared on highly technical and
questionable grounds that the Court had no authority to rule. Id. at 2697. In contrast,
in Shelby County he joined the five-Justice majority in ignoring an analogous technical
point that would have prevented the Court from ruling as it did. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at
2644-48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, pointing out that the Court would normally not hear
such a “facial” challenge to a statute brought by a party in the position of the Georgia
county). More telling was his heated rhetoric in Windsor. Rejecting invalidation there, he
castigated the majority and insisted that the case was “about the power of our people to
govern themselves.” The Court’s decision, he charged, sprang from the “diseased root” of
the majority’s “exalted conception of the role of this institution in America.” Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2698. In contrast, supporting invalidation in Shelby County, he was prepared to dismiss
the fact that the Voting Rights Act had been previously upheld by the Court, repeatedly
re-enacted by Congress, and most recently extended once again by overwhelming majorities
in both the House and the Senate. To justify that dismissal, he was prepared to denigrate
the popular political considerations that he saw driving congressional passage of the act,
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have shaped the law and the judicial process, court-centered legal history can
more fully sensitize the public—and perhaps the judges themselves—to the
role that personal views and values play in judicial decision-making.95 Greater
public awareness may work to restrain judges in giving way to such subjective
influences, and greater judicial awareness may nudge some judges—those
without dominating ideological goals—toward greater self-scrutiny and actual
self-restraint.96 Such greater awareness will focus attention on the driving
social reasons judges chose one “logic” rather than another. That, in turn, may
focus attention more closely on the anticipated practical consequences of the
choices they make. As Judge Richard A. Posner suggests, in cases involving
substantial judicial discretion, it would influence “judicial decisions for the
good” if advocates were encouraged to emphasize “the practical stakes in
their cases and how the stakes would be affected by the court’s deciding those
cases one way rather than another.”97 Together, greater public and judicial
sensitivity to historical contexts and consequences could reduce the likelihood
that judicial decision-making would rest comfortably on undisclosed personal
considerations and unacknowledged social consequences.
Whether and to what extent legal history can actually contribute
significantly to such a goal is uncertain and perhaps doubtful.98 Regardless
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-17, 46-47, Shelby County v. Holder (Feb. 27, 2013) and to
ignore the central fact that the act was designed to protect the right of citizens to vote and
thereby to “govern themselves.” See John Paul Stevens, The Court & the Right to Vote: A Dissent,
60 N. Y. Rev. Books 37, 39 (August 15, 2013).
95.

Legal history tends to show the influence of personal factors in particular cases and for
individual judges, while empirical and statistical studies by social scientists and other
students of judicial behavior show the influence of those factors more generally and
comprehensively. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (1998);
H. W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme
Court (1994); Rob Robinson, Executive Branch Socialization and Deference on the U.S. Supreme Court,
46 Law & Soc’y Rev. 889 (2012); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial
Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. Legal Analysis 775 (2009); and sources cited in notes 54, 86, 92
supra.

96.

While court-centered legal history requires a “double consciousness,” see supra text
accompanying note 33, wise and informed judicial decision-making contains its own
similar requirement. “Either one recognizes one’s moral impulses and their bearing upon
one’s conceptions, or one does not. In neither case do they disappear.” Judith N. Shklar,
Legalism 224 (1964). Many, perhaps most, judges are well aware of those impulses. See
generally David M. O’Brien, ed., Judges on Judging: Views from the Bench; Charles E.
Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law
Tradition, 71 Yale L. J. 255 (1961).

97.

Posner, supra note 36, at 119. Posner, however, doubts that judges could accept such an
open recognition of the personal views that influence their decision-making. Id. at 289. For
a recent critique of Posner’s work and a defense of the values of “formalism,” see Jeremy
Waldron, Unfettered Judge Posner, 61 N.Y. Rev. Books 34 (March 20, 2014) (reviewing Richard
A. Posner, Reflections on Judging (2013).

98.

“[O]ne cannot preach introspection with much success. Nor is introspection the same thing
as self-knowledge. We use introspection to acquit ourselves of accusations of bias, while
using realistic notions of human behavior to identify bias in others.” Posner, supra note 36,
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of its actual day-to-day impact, however, legal history remains for judges a
source of wise counsel and a salubrious prod to greater self-awareness, just as
it remains for both lawyers and the general public a useful tool for evaluating
judicial behavior and understanding the operation of the nation’s legal
system.99 Few contributions are more important for the informed operation of
a constitutional democracy, and few understandings more important for a full
and sound legal education.
IV. Conclusion
Understanding the paradoxical nature of court-centered legal history leads
to a deeper appreciation of its special educational values. Most basically, it
illuminates the real-world workings of the law: its contingency and complexity,
its malleable and evolving content, its interconnections with the world around
it, and its ultimate roots in human values and choices. It sharpens our insights
into legal methods, judicial processes, and the varieties of “rules of law.”
Further, it may contribute to sounder and less personal judicial decisionmaking and inspire more informed public evaluation of judicial actions and
their consequences. To those who would pay close heed, moreover, it suggests
both the need for situation-specific prudence in addressing legal problems and
the weighty public responsibilities that fall on citizens in the United States
and other constitutional democracies.
For lawyers in particular, court-centered legal history teaches how to
contribute wisely and effectively to the successful operation of democratic
constitutionalism.100 All lawyers, no matter the nature of their widely varied
practices, act in light of culturally based perspectives on life, law, and their
chosen profession, and those perspectives influence their work and seep—
often imperceptibly—into their professional behavior. By illuminating those
culturally based perspectives, court-centered legal history can add depth and
insight to the work of lawyers in any kind of practice. Moreover, because all
lawyers have an ethical duty to support and improve the law, court-centered
legal history can inform their understanding of those obligations and help
channel their efforts to meet them. Equally important, because lawyers are
not merely professionals but also citizens who act in a wide range of public
capacities and contexts, those broader perspectives can aid them in those
varied roles.101 Indeed, all citizens acting in the public sphere could profit
at 121.
99.

“A residuum will be left [in judicial decision-making] where the personality of the judge, his
taste, his training or his bent of mind, may prove the controlling factor.” Cardozo, supra note
32, at 53.

100. See, e.g., Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism: Lawyers’ Independence in Context (draft article)
(on file with author).
101. Bar associations, for example, are frequently called on to examine and evaluate proposed
legislation. To intelligently accomplish that task, lawyers must understand not only how the
formal law stands at the moment but why it developed as it did, how it currently functions,
and what impact proposed changes would have on its future operations and consequences.
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from legal history’s “double consciousness,” its informed understanding
that welcomes the most penetrating critiques of the law’s shortcomings and
failures while nourishing a deep appreciation of the law’s noble ideals and
incalculable values. Thus, court-centered legal history serves the broadest and
most fundamental purposes of a true education in the law.
Further, legal history also serves more specific practical purposes. An
understanding of the complex, shifting, and contingent interactions between
“legal” and “non-legal” forces is a sine qua non for truly incisive legal analysis
and ultimately for effective legal action. Understanding the relationship
between enveloping social context, the practical significance of legal disputes,
the nature and positions of adverse parties, the discretion available to both
advocates and judges in interpreting potentially applicable legal rules, and
the particular characteristics of relevant courts, judges, and parties is acutely
valuable in designing legal tactics and crafting winning arguments.102 Indeed,
such an understanding highlights the vast difference between knowing
how to construct a proper legal argument and recognizing—in the specific
circumstances of a particular case—the actual weight and bite of potentially
applicable legal authorities. Such an understanding also highlights the equally
vast and particularly critical difference between, on the one hand, knowing how
to construct a proper legal argument and, on the other hand, knowing how to
actually persuade a court to adopt that argument. Thus, a deeply informed
understanding of legal processes and judicial decision-making is essential for
lawyers to master their professional roles and perform high-quality legal work
for the diverse kinds of clients they represent.
Finally, and most immediately relevant for the present and future, courtcentered legal history is essential for those who would successfully adapt to the
changing demands of an ever more rapidly changing world.103 In “illuminating
the past,” the study of history “illuminates the present,” Cardozo noted, “and in
illuminating the present, illuminates the future.”104 Indeed, the four paradoxes
of legal history point to a fifth, the overarching paradox that confronts all
American lawyers today: that in the contemporary world of the early 21st
century the study of the law’s past has become more valuable than ever
before. Precisely because the contemporary world is changing so rapidly and
so radically, it is essential that lawyers and judges understand the ineluctable
processes of historical change and the ways in which those processes challenge
and shape the legal system’s doctrines, practices, and institutions.
Newly minted lawyers entering practice during the coming decades will
witness over the course of their careers sweeping and sometimes astonishing
changes in almost every aspect of legal practice. To be adequately prepared
102. Early in his career Hurst stressed history’s usefulness for legal practice in informing lawyers
of “what motives may move judges.” William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State: The
Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 Law & Hist. Rev. 97, 103 (2000).
103. See, e.g., Alfred S. Konefsky & Barry Sullivan, There’s More to the Law than “Practice-Ready,”
Chron. Higher Ed. Oct. 28, 2011, at A30.
104. Cardozo, supra note 32, at 53.
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for their profession they must know far more than specific techniques and
currently prevailing forms, rules, and practices. They must also understand
how and why the world and its legal systems interact and change. Thus, in
the years and decades ahead, an understanding of the dynamics of social
change, the impact of evolving social contexts on formal legal processes, and
the salience of shifting and contingent institutional interrelationships in the
legal system will prove of inestimable practical value. In those coming years
and decades both lawyers and judges will be forced repeatedly to grapple
with—and make critical choices about—a multitude of novel, complex, and
wholly unanticipated challenges that will arise in that unknowable but surely
dynamic and different future.

